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11 Introduction
A large empirical literature has looked at wage returns to job seniority, using a whole
arsenal of econometric techniques, see Farber (1999) for a survey. The conclusions of
this research still diverge, despite analyzing data from the same countries (mainly the
USA) or even the same longitudinal datasets (mostly the PSID): while some authors
ﬁnd that large estimated returns are spurious and wage returns to tenure are actually
very small, e.g. Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Abraham and Farber (1987), Altonji and
Williams (1997, 2005), Abowd et al (1999), others conﬁrm large and signiﬁcant wage
returns close to cross-section estimates, e.g. Topel (1991), Dustmann and Meghir
(2005), Buchinsky et al (2005). Here we provide a new direction for investigating
the wage-tenure relationship. From a theoretical point of view, large "true" returns
to tenure are problematic. Were there really large returns, the worker-ﬁrm match
would spoil large gains from trade at the moment of separation. Why would a worker
separate when he loses his tenure proﬁle by doing so? Hence, separation is likely to
be induced by the ﬁr m ,w h a tw ec a l lal a y o ﬀ. But why would the worker and the
ﬁrm not renegotiate the wage instead of separating? Although some models, such as
eﬃciency wage models, can explain why this renegotiation process might not be fully
eﬃcient, the size of the wage returns to seniority reported in some papers remains
puzzling. In fact, the empirical evidence oﬀers support for at least some form of
renegotiation. For instance Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) have shown that
displaced workers face severe wage cuts of up to 25% just before separation. This
paper addresses explicitly whether the existing evidence is consistent with eﬃcient
separations by modelling simultaneously the evolution of wages and the distribution
of job tenures.
We take eﬃcient bargaining as benchmark. Hence, quits and job layoﬀsa r eo b -
servationally equivalent, as in McLaughlin (1991). The model explains the observed
correlation between wages and job tenure from the random evolution of wages after
job start. This random evolution of wages is due to the random evolution of both
2the job’s productivity and the outside option. Separation occurs when the value of
the productivity in the job falls below the value of the outside option, which depends
on the initial productivity at the job start in the best alternative job. We refer to
this initial productivity in the best alternative as the "outside productivity" and to
the productivity in the job as the "inside productivity". The observed correlation
b e t w e e nw a g e sa n dt e n u r ei sc a u s e db yt h ef a c tt h a to n l yj o b st h a te v o l v ef a v o r a b l y
relative to the outside productivity survive. Hence, there is no such thing as "the"
return to tenure in this model. In some jobs wages go up because the job’s produc-
tivity value evolves favorably. In others wages go down for mutatis mutandis the
same reason. However, the latter group is gradually eliminated from the stock of
ongoing employment relations just because there are no options for mutually gainful
renegotiation left and hence separation becomes eﬃcient.
The evolution of an individual’s within-job log wage is reasonably described by a
random walk with transitory shocks, as previously found by Abowd and Card (1989),
Topel (1991) and Topel and Ward (1992), hypothesis that we verify on our PSID
estimation sample. Whereas this observation received little attention among labor
economists, we take it as cornerstone of our modelling. Both log in- and outside
productivity are assumed to follow a random walk. Our model implies that log wages
are a linear combination of both, which implies that log wages in the job follow a
random walk as well. Hence, the diﬀerence in the drift between the log wage in
the job and the log outside productivity is what we traditionally call "the return to
tenure".
Each job requires some form of speciﬁc investment. That speciﬁcity can be any-
thing. Training is just one aspect. For most jobs other aspects are more important,
such as getting to know your new colleagues, knowing where to make photocopies or
w h e r et og e tac u po fc o ﬀee, organizing your home-to-work travel eﬃciently etc. Upon
separation the worker and the ﬁrm lose the value of these speciﬁc investments. Since
separation is irreversible, the investments have an option value. The combination of
3irreversible speciﬁc investment and inside and outside productivities following ran-
dom walks implies that we can apply the theory of real options, see for example Dixit
(1989), Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Option theory
allows us to calculate the reservation value of productivity for which separation be-
comes the eﬃcient alternative. Teulings and van der Ende (2000) use this model for
the analysis of distribution of job tenures when the inside option is stochastic and the
o u t s i d eo p t i o ni sc o n s t a n t .T h ep r e d i c t e dh a z a r dr a t e so ft h i sm o d e la r ew e l li nl i n e
with the empirical distribution of the job exits. Our model shares some features with
Mortensen’s (1988) dual "on-the-job-training and matching" model, starting from the
same basic idea of jointly modelling optimal separation behavior and individual wage
evolution over time and providing qualitatively similar empirical implications for the
job tenure distribution. One of the essential diﬀerences is the fact that our "match
quality" (surplus of the job’s productivity over the worker’s outside option) evolves
randomly and the intensity of the shocks to the match quality does not diminish with
time as in a Bayesian learning framework.
From the distribution of job tenures we are able to estimate the surplus of the
job’s productivity above its reservation value and a (linear) drift of this surplus, up
to a normalizing constant (the variance of the random walk). We obtain a positive
drift surplus, indicating that some 10% of all jobs will end only by retirement. We use
these parameters to compute the expected surplus in both completed and incomplete
job spells, which will enable us to estimate the evolution of wages. The typical
problem in this literature is that the researcher observes the outside productivity
only at job start and at job separation, if the worker starts a new job immediately
afterwards. At job start, the worker chooses the best alternative that is available at
that moment, which is by deﬁnition equal to the outside productivity. The initial
wage in this job is therefore a linear function of the value of the outside productivity
at job start. Applying the same reasoning, the ﬁrst wage in the next job is a function
of the outside productivity at the moment of separation from the previous job. Our
4estimation procedure exploits both pieces of information on the outside productivity
t ot h em a x i m u m .T ot h a te n d ,w ee l a b o r a t ea ni d e aﬁrst explored by Abraham and
Farber (1987): we condition the expected wage growth within a job not only on the
elapsed duration since job start -that is: current job tenure- but also on the remaining
time span left till the next separation, so we take into account the complete duration
of the job. We can calculate a closed form expression for this expectation. As a
ﬁrst result, we show that this expression does not depend on the drift surplus. This
implies that the evolution of wages in completed spells is uninformative on the return
to tenure. This is a remarkable conclusion given the fact that so many papers have
tried to identify the return to tenure from this type of data. The only sources of
information on the return to tenure are the distribution of completed tenures and
the evolution of wages in incomplete job spells. The fat right tail in the tenure
distribution, with many jobs never ending, is an indication of large returns to tenure:
the return to tenure is so high that separation is rarely eﬃcient, except for cases
where the random walk evolves really unfavorably.
As a second result, we demonstrate the fragility of the tenure proﬁle identiﬁca-
tion. The problem is not so much the selectivity in the observed wage proﬁle, as the
selectivity in the outside productivity. Observed outside productivities are positively
selected, since we observe them only at the moment when workers switch jobs and
workers switch jobs only when the outside productivity is high. This source of selec-
tivity usually receives less attention than the selectivity in the inside wage. We show
that this eﬀect can be identiﬁe df r o mt h ew a g ec h a n g ef o rj o bm o v e r s ,b u tt h a tt h i s
is a thin line of identiﬁcation. Surprisingly, selectivity in the outside wage turns out
to be an empirically important phenomenon; this selectivity provides a new source of
a" t e n u r ep r o ﬁle", accounting for about 85% o ft h et e n u r ep r o ﬁle we estimate.
The empirical results show that our model does very well in explaining the con-
cavity in the "observed" tenure proﬁle. Since the "true" tenure proﬁle, the drift in
the diﬀerence between inside and outside productivity, is linear by assumption, this
5concavity is fully due to selection. One could argue that our identiﬁcation procedure
relies heavily on functional form assumptions. Nevertheless, there is one strong test of
our assumptions: the estimated variance of the innovation in wages is consistent with
the concavity in the "observed" tenure proﬁle. There is nothing in our estimation
procedure that drives this result. Furthermore, we do observe a smaller wage increase
during the ﬁrst half of the job spell than at similar tenures for jobs that separate
later or not at all, as predicted by the model. However, we do not observe wages
falling during the second half of the job spell, as also predicted by the model. This
ﬁts the idea of downward rigidity, as discussed for example by Beaudry and DiNardo
(1991), who ﬁnd that within a job spell wages go up in the upturn, but do not go
down in the downturn. Nonetheless, at the moment of separation, the gap is ﬁlled
by an additional wage decline for job changers. Hence, our empirical results provide
support for an amended version of the model, where we allow for downward rigidity
in wages. This rigidity does not ﬁtt h ee ﬃcient bargaining hypothesis. In unionized
jobs, the fall in wages at the date of separation is much larger. It is hard to see
how these results can be squared with Nash bargaining. The estimated tenure proﬁle
is on the high end of the spectrum, 5% per year, though more than ﬁve sixths of
the return take the form of a declining outside productivity instead of a rising inside
productivity. If we were to exclude this part of the proﬁle, our estimates would be
on the low end of the spectrum, 0.6% per year.
W h i l ew ef o c u so nﬁrm tenure, our model could equally well be applied to industry
or occupation tenure, as suggested by Neal (1995). Many speciﬁc skills are likely to
be industry or occupation-speciﬁc and are thus irreversibly lost if the worker quits
the industry or the occupation, but not if she switches from the one to the other ﬁrm.
One would expect greater losses when switching between industries or occupations
then when just changing jobs, as is reported by Neal (1995). We leave this extension
for future research.
The paper is structured as follows: the model is discussed in Section 2, the em-
6pirical analysis in Section 3 and Section 4 concludes.
2 The Random Productivity Growth Model
2.1 Model Assumptions
Consider a labor market in continuous time, where a job is a unique match between
a risk neutral worker and a risk neutral ﬁrm. The risk neutrality of both players
implies that there is no insurance problem. We ignore any disutility of eﬀort, so that
the worker’s utility depends only on her income. There is no search cost involved
from either party in ﬁnding the optimal match. A worker picks therefore that va-
cancy that yields the highest expected net discounted value. At the start of the job,
speciﬁc investments are made, which are irreversibly lost upon a separation between
the worker and the ﬁrm. However, the ﬁrm retains the property right on the vacancy.
That is, it can hire at any future time provided that the new worker and the ﬁrm are
prepared to pay the cost of the speciﬁc investment again. These speciﬁc investments
are veriﬁable, so that there are no hold-up problems: the worker and the ﬁrm can
always agree on a side payment at the start of their relation that oﬀsets expected
unbalances in bargaining power. We shall relax this assumption later on, when dis-
cussing the impact of unions. Furthermore, the investments are made instantaneously
and do not require any time for implementation. The log productivity of the job and
t h el o go u t s i d ew a g ee v o l v eo v e rt i m ea c c o r d i n gt oar a n d o mw a l k .B o t hw o r k e ra n d
ﬁrm are perfectly informed about their current value, but their future evolution is
unknown. The worker and the ﬁrm bargain over the surplus of the inside productivity
over its reservation value. This bargaining is eﬃcient: as long as there is a surplus,
the worker and the ﬁrm will agree on a sharing rule. At some moment the produc-
tivity has fallen below its reservation value so that separation becomes the eﬃcient
alternative. Then, separation occurs at mutual consent since there are no gains from
trade left. Turnover is therefore eﬃcient, and quits and layoﬀs are observationally
7identical, as in McLaughlin (1991). For the sake of convenience, we shall refer to
separations as the ﬁrm ﬁring the worker in the rest of the paper, though separations
c a nb eb o t hq u i t so rl a y o ﬀs. Given these assumptions (risk neutrality, no hold up
problems, and eﬃcient bargaining), wage setting and separation decisions can be ana-
lyzed separately, since matching and separation decisions maximize the joint surplus,
regardless of its precise distribution. This section focuses on the separation decision,
wage setting being discussed in the next section.
We assume that job’s productivity Pt f o l l o w sag e o m e t r i cB r o w n i a n .T h eo u t s i d e
productivity Rt is also a geometric Brownian with drift. This outside productivity
Rt is the initial productivity in the best job available at time t. Since individuals can
costlessly pick this best alternative, Pt = Rt at the moment of job start. The speciﬁc
investments at the moment of job start are proportional to the reservation wage: RtI.
One can think of I as cost of investment measured in units of labor time and of Rt as
t h ep r i c eo fo n eu n i t .U s i n gl o w e rc a s e st od e n o t et h el o g so ft h ec o r r e s p o n d i n gu p p e r
cases, the law of motion between arbitrary dates s and t,w i t hs<t , is characterized
by a bivariate normal distribution:
⎡





















We refer to Pt−Rt as the absolute current surplus over which the worker and the
ﬁrm bargain. Let V (pt,r t) and J (pt,r t) be the expected present value of a vacancy
and respectively a job, both as functions of log in- and outside productivity pt and
rt. The Bellman equations for both value functions read (see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck,
81994) :






















w h e r ew el e a v eo u tt h ea r g u m e n t so fJ (·) and V (·) for convenience and where ρ
denotes the interest rate. The ﬁrst term in the expression for J is the current output of
the job, the other terms capture the wealth eﬀects due to changes in the state variables
pt and rt;t h eﬁrst order derivatives capture the eﬀect of the drift in both state
variables, the second order derivatives capture the eﬀect of their variance. Further,
the value matching and smooth pasting conditions read:
J (rS,r S)=V (rS,r S)+e x p ( rS)I (3)
V (pT,r T)=J (pT,r T)
Jp (rS,r S)+Jr (rS,r S)=Vp (rS,r S)+Vr (rS,r S)+e x p ( rS)I
Vp (pT,r T)=Jp (pT,r T)
Vr (pT,r T)=Jr (pT,r T)
where S i st h em o m e n to fj o bs t a r ta n dT is the moment of separation. The ﬁrst
condition states that at the moment of job start (when by deﬁnition, pS = rS), the
value of a ﬁlled job must be equal to the value of the vacancy plus the cost of speciﬁc
investment. The second condition states that at the moment of job separation, the
value of the job is equal to the value of a vacancy. The last three conditions are the
smooth pasting conditions. These conditions and the Bellman equations (2) jointly
determine J (·) and V (·).




9Since Pt and Rt follow a geometric Brownian, Bt also does:
bt − bs ∼ N
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μ ≡ μp − μr
where again bt denotes logBt.B yc o n s t r u c t i o n ,bt = pt − rt and bS =0 .
Proposition 1 The value functions J (·) and V (·) can be written as:
J (pt,r t)=e x p ( rt)j (pt − rt) (5)
V (pt,r t)=e x p ( rt)v(pt − rt)
where j (·) and v(·) satisfy:
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where we leave out the argument of j (·) and v(·) for convenience. The value matching
and smooth pasting conditions at the moment of job start and job separation read:









10Proof. The proposition follows directly from substitution1 of equation (5) in the
Bellman equations (2) and the value matching and smooth pasting conditions (3),
using bS =0 .
The factor ρ − μr − 1
2σ2
r is a modiﬁed discount rate, which accounts for the fact
that future revenues are discounted at a rate ρ, but increase in expectation at a rate
μr + 1
2σ2
r due to the drift and the variance of Rt. The hiring and separation rule
depend therefore purely on bt: a vacancy should be ﬁlled at the ﬁrst time S that
bt rises up to bh =0 ,aw o r k e ra n daﬁrm should separate the worker at the ﬁrst
time T that bt falls below bs.O n e c a n p r o v e :bs < 0.T h e v a l u e o f bh and bs can
be expressed as a function of the model’s parameters I,μ,Σ and the interest rate ρ,
using the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions above, as described in detail
by Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
2.2 Job Tenure Distribution
Without loss of generality we normalize the moment of job start to zero, S =0 ,i n
what follows. Hence, b0 = bh =0 .F r o mt h a tm o m e n to n ,bt evolves according to its
law of motion speciﬁed in equation (4). The separation occurs at the ﬁrst moment
t = T when bt = bs. Hence, T is the completed tenure of that job spell. Analogously
t ot h ep r o b i tm o d e l ,w h e r et h ev a r i a nce of the error term is non-identiﬁed and can
therefore be normalized to unity without loss of generality, σ, the standard deviation
of bt,i su n i d e n t i ﬁed in this model. We normalize therefore all other parameters by σ.
1We use:
Jp =e x p ( rt)j0,J pp =e x p( rt)j00
Jr =e x p ( rt)(j − j0),J rr =e x p( rt)(j − 2j0 + j00)












Thus Ωt is a Brownian with drift π and unit variance per unit time, with Ω0 = Ω and
ΩT =0 ,w h e r eT is a stochastic variable determined by the evolution of bt. Ωt is the
surplus of the inside productivity pt a b o v ei t sr e s e r v a t i o nv a l u ea tw h i c hs e p a r a t i o n
becomes eﬃcient, relative to outside productivity rt and normalized by the standard
deviation of bt per unit of time. Hence, we refer to Ωt as the normalized surplus of
a job. The distribution of job tenures is the "First Passage Time" distribution (e.g.
Cox and Miller, 1965), the distribution of durations till the random walk Ωt passes
the single absorbing barrier Ωt =0for the ﬁrst time. The density function of Ωt,










where φ(·) is the standard normal PDF. However, a realization of Ωt is not interesting
if separation has occurred before time t. This situation cannot correspond to a job-
worker match since separation decisions are irreversible. We are thus interested in
the density of Ωt conditional on the fact that no separation has occurred before time
t,t h a ti sΩs > 0 for all 0 ≤ s<t . A simple methodology can be applied in this
regard, often used in pricing barrier options in mathematical ﬁnance, the stochastic
reﬂection principle: there is a one-to-one correspondence between trajectories from
Ω to Ωt having crossed Ωs =0at least once, and trajectories from −Ω to Ωt.T h i s
latter group of trajectories should be subtracted from the trajectories from Ω to Ωt
for the calculation of the density of all trajectories from Ω to Ωt that never crossed
12Ωs =0 .L e t g(ω,t,Ω) be the joint density/probability of Ωt = ω and T>t ,s o
g(ω,t,Ω) ≡ Pr(Ωt = ω ∧ T>t |Ω) (we add the parameter Ω as an argument for




















where the factor e−2Ωπ corrects for the diﬀerential eﬀect of the drift on the density
for upward and downward trajectories. The cumulative distribution of jobs surviving
at time t, 1 − F (t,Ω), is calculated by integrating g(ω,t,Ω) over Ωt ∈ [0,∞):

















where Φ(.) is the standard normal CDF. The distribution of completed job tenures is
therefore fully speciﬁed by two parameters, the distance from the separation thresh-
old at job separation Ω and the drift π. The corresponding density function is the
























The job exit rate is then given by f(t,Ω)/[1 − F(t,Ω)]. It is straightforward to
check that the exit rate is hump shaped, starting from 0,r e a c h i n gap e a ka tt∗,
0 <t ∗ < 2/3Ω2, and afterwards either declining monotonically to 0 for positive drift
π>0 or to 1/2π2 for negative drift π<0. Farber (1994), Teulings and Van der Ende
(2000) and Horowitz and Lee (2002) have documented this hump shaped pattern
using NLSY data. A positive drift implies a non exhaustive behavior, where some
jobs never end. The fraction of surviving job spells for π>0 is given by the survivor
function (7) when t →∞ , hence by 1 − e−2Ωπ. W ep l o tt h ee x i tr a t e sf o rp a i r s








surplus : 0.32 , drift : 0.15
surplus : 0.30 , drift : 0.23
Figure 1: Predicted Job Hazards
Ω =0 .32 and π =0 .15 and respectively Ω =0 .30 and π =0 .23 (these are mean
values for Ω and π from our estimations of the tenure distribution parameters, see
Section 3 below) in Figure 1. In both cases the peak is reached at t ' 0.04 years.
Since π>0, the hazard rate converges to zero and a positive fraction of the jobs will
never end. For mean values of parameters of Ω =0 .32 and π =0 .15 about 10 %
of the jobs never end. We conclude that parameters Ω and π can be identiﬁed from
data on the distribution of job tenures, but parameter σ cannot.
2.3 Tenure Proﬁle in Wages
2.3.1 Sharing Rule of Surpluses
We extend the model with an explicit sharing rule of surpluses during the course
of the job spell. We use a rule stipulating that the surplus bt − bs is shared in ﬁxed
14proportions between the worker and the ﬁrm2.T h ew o r k e r ’ sl o gw a g ewt then satisﬁes:
wt = rt + b
s + β (bt − b
s)=rt + b
s + σΩt (9)
where σ ≡ βσ. We interpret β as the worker’s bargaining power. Equation (9) implies
eﬃcient separation, since at the moment of separation t = T, bT = bs, and hence,
wT = rT + bs.S i n c ebs = pT − rT, this implies wT = pT: log wages are equal to log
inside productivity. For a slightly lower pt, wt >p t and ﬁrms prefer separation above
continuation of the employment relation. Log wages within a job follow a Brownian
with drift μr + σπ.T h e t e r m σπ i st h et e n u r ep r o ﬁle. At the start of each job,
t =0and Ωt = Ω. After job start, Ωt goes up in expectation with π every period,
conditional on the fact that Ωt remains positive. Were job separations independent
of the realization of Ωt (and of rt), we would have:
E(wt|t<T )=E(rt)+b
s + σπt
In that case, the tenure proﬁle would be estimated easily, for instance in discrete time
by ﬁrst diﬀerencing the equation above and then comparing log wage growth for job
stayers and job changers:
stayers : ∆E(wt|1 <t<T)=μr + σπ
changers : ∆E(w
∗
t|t = T)=μr − σπ(T − 1)
where ∆ is the ﬁrst diﬀerence operator and where the superscript ∗ indicates that
we compare log wages in the new and the old job; hence, ∆w∗
T compares the starting
wage in the new job to the wage one year before separation in the old job.
However, in completed job spells Ωt is correlated to T for three reasons: (i) Ω0 = Ω,
2This is more pragmatic than what is commonly used, ie. a sharing rule of the return on the
expected discounted value of all future absolute surpluses, instead of the instantaneous relative
surplus. Our approach can be viewed as a ﬁrst order expansion of that rule.
15(ii) ΩT =0 , and (iii) Ωt > 0 for 0 ≤ t<T . Empirically, rt is only observed at the
beginning of a job: r0 = w0 − bs − σΩ, and at the end of a job: rT = wT − bs.I n
between, the researcher has no information on rt, but only on wt.O u r s t r a t e g y i s
to calculate E(Ωt) conditional on the three pieces of information available, (i), (ii),
and (iii), and to enter this expectation as a regressor in a regression of within job log
wage growth. Mutatis mutandis t h es a m ea p p l i e st oj o bs p e l l st h a td on o te n db e f o r e
t h ee n do ft h et i m es p a nc o v e r e db yt h ed a t a ,t h ei n c o m p l e t ej o bs p e l l s .L e tL be the
last date on which data are available. What we know about an incomplete job spell
is that it is still running at L. Hence, there are again three pieces of information: (i)
Ω0 = Ω, (ii) T>L>t, and hence (iii) Ωt > 0 for 0 ≤ t<L . And again we calculate
the conditional expectation E(Ωt). Below we discuss the conditional expectation, ﬁrst
for completed and then for incomplete job spells.
2.3.2 Conditional Expectation of Ωt for Completed Spells
Let h(ω,t,τ) be the density of Ωt = ω conditional on (i) Ω0 = Ω,( i i )Ωτ =0 , and (iii)
Ωt > 0 for 0 ≤ t<τ . Comparing this density to g(ω,t,Ω), there is one additional
condition: Ωτ =0 ,o re q u i v a l e n t l y ,T = τ. When we want to apply Bayes’s rule,
we need the distribution of T conditional on Ωt = ω.S i n c e Ωt is a martingale, the
distribution of T conditional on Ωt = ω is equal to the distribution of T = τ − t
conditional on Ω = ω. Hence, its density is f (τ − t,ω), see equation (8). Then
h(ω,t,τ) c a nb ec a l c u l a t e df r o mf (·) and g(·) by Bayes’s rule, see equations (6) and
(8):
h(ω,t,τ)=
f(τ − t,ω)g(ω,t,Ω) R ∞
0 f(τ − t,x)g(x,t,Ω)dx
(10)
16The conditional expectation reads:























where τ denotes the realization of T. The derivation is discussed in Appendix A1.
The remarkable feature of this expression is that it does not depend on the tenure
proﬁle in wages, π. Hence, conditional on the model that we speciﬁed, the evolution
of wages in completed job spells does not provide any information at all on the tenure
proﬁle in wages. Given the many papers that have tried to do so, this is a staggering
conclusion.
E(Ωt|0 <t<T= τ) satisﬁes the following conditions:
lim
t−>0E(Ωt|0 <t < T = τ)=Ω
lim
t−>T


















T h ef u l le x p r e s s i o no fd e r i v a t i v e sa saf u n c t i o no ft can be found in the Appendix A1.
The ﬁrst two lines above ﬁto u ra s s u m p t i o n st h a taj o bs t a r t sa tΩ0 = Ω and ends at
ΩT =0 . The third line says that the initial slope is negative for short spells, T<Ω2,
and positive for longer spells. For short spells the expected surplus must decline
immediately to reach ΩT =0in time. Therefore these spells are a selective sample
of trajectories for which the expected surplus declines right from the start of the job
spell. Correspondingly, the long spells T>Ω2 are the selective sample for which the














Figure 2: Expected Surplus in Completed Job Spells
opposite holds. The fourth line shows that the expected surplus declines inﬁnitely
fast just before separation. Trajectories that separate the next minute are therefore
a highly selective sample. This result is consistent with the empirical evidence by
Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) on the decline in the wage proﬁle in the
period just before the moment of separation. The ﬁnal line above shows that the
second derivative is always negative. Hence, the expected surplus is concave in t;i t
is monotonically decreasing for short spells T<Ω2 a n di ti sh u m ps h a p e df o rl o n g e r
spells. The tenure proﬁle is plotted for the estimated mean value Ω =0 .32 and for
various values of T in Figure 2. For T ≤ 0.1 years the tenure proﬁle is monotonically
decreasing, while for larger T it is increasingly concave. The top of the proﬁle is
increasing in T, showing the importance of conditioning on the eventual tenure.
2.3.3 Conditional Expectation of Ωt for Incomplete Spells
The conditional expectation for incomplete job spells, E(Ωt|t<L<T),i sc a l c u l a t e d
by using the same methodology as in the case of the completed job spells. Let
h∗(ω,t,L) be the density of Ωt = ω conditional on (i) Ω0 = Ω,( i i )Ωt > 0 for











Figure 3: Expected Surplus in Incomplete Job Spells
0 ≤ t<L , and (iii) T>L . The application of the Bayes rule leads to the following
expression for the conditional density:
h
∗(ω,t,L)=
[1 − F(L − t,ω)]g(ω,t,Ω) R ∞
0 [1 − F(L − t,x)]g(x,t,Ω)dx
(12)
This density can by used for the calculation of the conditional expectation in the same
way as equation (11). Contrary to the case of completed spells, there is however no
explicit expression for the conditional expectation in this case, cf. Appendix A2 for
the ﬁnal expressions on which numerical integration is performed. Figure 3 presents
the trajectory of E(Ωt|t<L<T ) for Ω =0 .32,π =0 .15 and L =1 ,3,5,10.T h e
higher L, the more information on T is available, since T>L .
E(Ωt|t<L<T) for a ﬁxed t is increasing in L. The reason is that higher values of
L imply a greater selectivity, since more and more trajectories leading to a separation
have been selected out. Were there no selectivity, then the trajectory would be linear,
E(Ωt|t<L<T)= E(Ωt)=πt. The trajectories are strongly concave, implying that
selection plays an important role. Contrary to the completed spells case, incomplete
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Figure 4: Selectivity versus Drift in the Expected Surplus
spells do provide information on the drift π. Nevertheless the impact of the drift is
negligible compared to selectivity, as documented by Figure 4, which compares the
trajectories of the conditional expectation in completed spells, in incomplete spells
and in absence of any selectivity. The concavity outweighs the linear trajectory
by far, at least for the ﬁrst ﬁve years.We also plot conditional expectations of the
surplus for mean values of the tenure distribution parameters in both completed and
incomplete job spells, for very long job durations. Trajectories of the expected surplus
for T =1 0 ,20 and respectively L =1 0 ,20 are plotted in Figure 5. One notices that
the diﬀerence between the expected surplus in completed job spells and incomplete
job spells increases with the time span. At the same time the strong concavity due
to selection is clearly visible in both cases.
2.3.4 Expected Within-Job and Between-Job Wage Growth
We can apply the conditional expectations of Ωt in incomplete and completed job
spells for the analysis of the expected wage growth ∆wt within a job and respectively
∆w∗
T between jobs. For this purpose, we decompose the random variables [∆pt,∆rt]














Figure 5: Expected Surplus in Long Spells
in two orthogonal components ∆bt and ∆zt, such that Cor(∆bt,∆zt)=0 .G i v e nt h e
previous assumptions on the joint normality of ∆pt and ∆rt, such a decomposition is
always feasible. Hence, for 1 <t<T,
∆rt = ∆zt − γβ∆bt = ∆zt − γσ∆Ωt (13)
∆wt = ∆zt +( 1− γ)β∆bt = ∆zt +( 1− γ)σ∆Ωt
with ∆zt ∼ N (μz,σ2
z) and Cov(∆zt,∆bt)=0 . Obviously, the parameter γ can
be expressed in terms of the covariance matrix Σ and the bargaining power β,b u t
that is of little help here. It is more useful to interpret it as a reﬂection of the
correlation between the match surplus and the reservation wage. In the one extreme
case γ =0 ,w ec a nw r i t e∆pt = ∆rt +∆bt, with both right-hand side variables being
uncorrelated. Then ∆rt reﬂects the evolution of the general human capital of the
worker in this job as well as in all other jobs, which evolves independently of the
value of the speciﬁcc a p i t a li nt h ep r e s e n tj o b ,∆bt. Hence, the duration of the actual
job is fully determined by its own (mis)fortune. Though the distinction between quits
and layoﬀs makes little sense in this model, separations look like layoﬀsi nt h i sc a s e :
21the ﬁrm ﬁres the worker since she is no longer productive. In the opposite extreme
case γ =1 ,w ec a nw r i t e∆rt = ∆pt −∆bt, again with both right-hand side variables
being uncorrelated. Now, ∆pt reﬂects the evolution of the general human capital of
the worker in this job as well as in all other jobs; ∆bt reﬂects the speciﬁce v o l u t i o no f
outside opportunities, e.g. new technologies emerging in other ﬁrms. Separations look
like quits in this case: the worker quits because she can get a better job elsewhere.
We can use equation (13) to specify four OLS regressions, which are discussed below.
Taking expectations in the second equation of (13) yields:
E(∆wt|1 <t < T = τ)=μz +( 1− γ)σE(∆Ωt|1 <t<T= τ) (14)
E(∆wt|1 < t<L<T)=μz +( 1− γ)σE(∆Ωt|1 <t<L<T)
Var (∆wt|t<T) ≡ σ
2
w
The ﬁrst equation from (14) applies for completed spells, where we observe T = τ;t h e
second equation applies for incomplete spells, where we only know that the job ends
beyond the period covered by the data, T>L . Since separation decisions are fully
determined by the evolution of bt (or, equivalently, Ωt)a n ds i n c e∆bt and ∆zt are
uncorrelated, there is no selectivity in ∆zt. Hence, the conditioning 1 <t<L<T
can be omitted in E(∆zt). As discussed before, Ω and π can be estimated from the
distribution of observed job spells. These parameters are suﬃcient statistics for the
calculation of the conditional expectations of ∆Ωt. These expectations can be used
as explanatory variables in a regression of within job log wage growth, ∆wt.3 These
equations identify (1−γ)σ, but not γ and σ separately. Hence, we can only infer the
p a r to ft h et e n u r ep r o ﬁle that is associated with the selectivity in wt,n o ti nrt.
3There is an alternative estimation strategy for within job log wage changes for completed spells.
We observe rt at the beginning and at the end of the job spell: r0 = w0−bs−σΩ and rT = w∗
0−bs−σΩ,
where w∗
0 is the starting wage in the new job and Ω is kept constant across jobs. We can add these
conditions to our regression analysis. Hence:







22For job changers, we can write a similar equation:
E(∆w
∗
t|t = T)=μz +( 1− γ)σE(∆Ωt|t = T)+σΩ
∗ (15)
The term E(∆Ωt|t = T) reﬂects the wage decline in the old job the year before
separation.4 It is always negative, see Figure 2. The term Ω∗ reﬂects the wage increase
due to entering the new job, where the log productivity pt is again substantially above
the log reservation wage rt. Equation (15) allows the separate identiﬁcation of γ and
σ,b yt h eﬁnal term, the upward jump in wages as a return to the speciﬁc investment
in the new job, σΩ∗. Hence, we are able to identify γ, and hence the selectivity in rt,
only by comparing the concavity of the tenure proﬁle within job spells to the jump
in wages when changing jobs. Otherwise, the data do not provide another way to
estimate this part of the selectivity.





0 − w0)=μzT + σ(Ω













The ﬁrst equation above follows immediately from the second equation of (13), since
ΩT =0 .T h eﬁrst term reﬂects the general drift in log wages. Though till sofar the
Then, taking ﬁrst diﬀerences and expectations in equation (9) yields:





We do not use this methodology here since it can only be applied to completed job spells, which,
moreover, start within the observation period of the data (for otherwise, we do not observe w0).
This is a small subset of the total number of job spells.
4Implicitly, we assume here that separation takes place exactly at the end of the year of observa-
tion. Taking the model literally, this is an important assumption, since wages decline steeply in the
last year before separation, see Figure 2. If separation occurs earlier on during the year of obser-
vation, part of the fall in wages during the last year before separation is captured by the previous
observation. In the empirical section we also use the "full fall" in wages.
23value of Ω was held constant across jobs, so that the second term drops out since
the diﬀerence between the value of Ω for subsequent jobs vanishes, Ω∗ − Ω =0 ,w e
retained this term for future reference. T h es e c o n de q u a t i o ni n( 1 6 )f o l l o w sf r o m
the second equation of (13), using the orthogonality of ∆zt and (1 − γ)β∆bt and
Var[(1 − γ)β∆bt]=( 1− γ)
2 σ2. The relation between the regression coeﬃcients on
E(∆Ωt|.) in equations (14) and (15) on the one hand, and the variances of ∆wt and
w∗
0 − w0 on the other hand, provides a strong test for the model:







0 − w0) (17)
This test relates the observed variance of wage changes within job spells, net of the
variance of the overall shock z, to the degree of concavity in wages. If the model sur-




We use a dataset based on a PSID extract of 18 waves, covering the years 1975
through 1992, same as the one used by Altonji and Williams (1997, 1999). Our
model does not work very well when employed people consider other alternatives
than switching to another job, like retirement, leaving the labor force or taking up
full time education. The availability of these other alternatives yields two problems.
First, we do not observe the reservation wage at the point of separation when people
do not accept another job. Second, with only one alternative to the present job, the
decision problem is simply whether a particular indicator switches signs. With more
alternatives, that choice process becomes far more complicated. Therefore we restrict
t h es a m p l et op e o p l ew h od on o ts w i t c hi na n do u tt h el a b o rf o r c er e g u l a r l ya n df o r
24whom retirement is not a relevant option: white male heads of household with more
than 12 years of education and less than 60 years of age. Our reasoning is similar to the
one used in Mincer and Jovanovic (1981), who also use job separation synonymous to
job change, thereby also deﬁning labor mobility as change of employer and excluding
other alternatives, which are minor phenomena in the case of the full-time male
working force. Furthermore, we restrict the attention to those individuals that were
employed, temporarily laid oﬀ, or unemployed at the time of the survey, and were
not from Alaska or Hawaii. We use the tenure and experience measures constructed
with the algorithm described by Altonji and Williams (1999 and previous working
versions). Table 1 presents summary statistics of the variables of interest. There are
missing values for all variables. Most missing values are reported for the log wage
variable. However, we do not need this variable in the tenure distribution analysis
and thus we include also the observations for which the log wage is not reported.
One can distinguish four types of job spells. Apart from the distinction between
completed and incomplete spells (right censoring), one can also make a distinction
between spells that start before the time span covered by the data, and spells that
start afterwards (left censoring). The table provides the number of spells of each of
these four types. There is, however, a fundamental diﬀerence between these types of
censoring. While right censoring implies that we do not know when a job spell has
ended, left censoring does not imply that we do not know when a job has started
because at the start of the observation period workers are asked for how long they
hold their present job.
3.2 Test of the Random Walk Hypothesis
To prepare the ground for our formal analysis we document some stylized facts on
wages. In particular, we verify that log wages follow a random walk, as assumed in
our theoretical modelling. For this purpose we repeat the analysis of wage dynamics
by MaCurdy (1982), Abowd and Card (1989) and Topel and Ward (1992). In the
25Table 1: Summary Statistics Dataset
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations
logwage(1) 2.44 0.49 0.06 4.82 18151
tenure (years) 7.45 7.88 0.08 43.69 20175
experience (years) 15.07 9.4 0.08 43.69 21099
year of observation 84.01 5.06 75 92 21099
job per individual 1.85 1.42 1 14 21099
age 34.56 9.68 18 60 21099
education (years) 13.69 1.77 12 17 20857
metropolis 0.61 0.49 0 1 21099
union member 0.21 0.41 0 1 20725
married 0.85 0.36 0 1 21099
Dataset for Estimating the Tenure Distribution Parameters
Number observations discarded from AW (1997) 5431
Number of individuals 2837
Total number job spells 5484
- started before the observed range 1924
- started within the observed range 3560
Completed job spells 1911
- started before the observed range 434
- started within the observed range 1477
Incomplete job spells 3573
(1)reported average hourly wage deﬂated using the implicit price deﬂator with 1982 base year
process of this analysis we document some further stylized facts that are useful in the
subsequent analysis. First, we run a regression of within-job log wage diﬀerentials
on a number of controls. Next, we construct a covariogram of residuals from this
regression, from which we infer the process driving the wage dynamics. Finally, we
show that the variance of the innovations in wages does not depend on experience
and tenure.
Consider the following model with a very simple tenure proﬁle:
wit = α + β1Eijt + β2E
2
ijt + γ1Tijt + γ2T
2
ijt + ηi + vj + uit (18)
where j (i,t) is the job j where worker i is employed at time t ( w el e a v eo u tt h e
arguments of j (·) for convenience); ηi is a random individual eﬀect (e.g. ability),
vj is a random job eﬀect, and uit is a time-varying stochastic component of wages. E
stands for labor market experience and T for job tenure. For the sake of the argument,
26let us assume that Tijt is orthogonal to uit.F i r s t - d i ﬀerencing equation (18) for job
stayers yields:




ijt + ∆uit (19)
Since Eit and Tijt increase at the same pace within jobs, we are not able to identify β1
and γ1 separately. This is one of the main problems in the identiﬁcation of the tenure
proﬁle in wages: only workers who switch jobs allow us to distinguish β1 and γ1.
However, β1+γ1 is estimated consistently in an OLS regression. We allow β1+γ1 to
vary by education level, for union members, for married people and for people living
in a metropolitan area. Furthermore, we add a full set of year dummies to account
for general variation in real wage growth and inﬂation, so that we do not obtain a
single estimate for β1 + γ1.F i r s t - d i ﬀerencing for job movers yields:
∆w
∗









where the superﬁx ∗ indicates that a job change has taken place and where Tijt is the
tenure in the old job. In this simple model, we can estimate the ﬁrst order eﬀect of
t h et e n u r ep r o ﬁle by the eﬀect of tenure on the change in wages for job movers. The
regression results are displayed in Table 2.
Table 2: Within and Between-Jobs Wage Change Regressions
Within-Jobs Between-Jobs
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.) Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
Intercept 0.055∗∗ (0.016) -0.058 (0.091)
∆Tenureijt -0.001 (0.009)
∆Tenure2
ijt -8e-4∗ (4e-4) 7e-4 (0.001)
∆Tenure3
ijt e-5† (8e-6) -e-5 (2e-5)
∆Experience2
it -0.002∗∗ (4e-4) -0.003 (0.002)
∆Experience3
it 2e-5∗∗ (7e-6) 3e-5 (4e-5)
Educationijt 9e-4 (9e-4) 0.008 (0.006)
Metropolisijt 0.007∗ (0.003) -0.011 (0.020)
Union memberijt 0.001 (0.004) -0.133∗∗ (0.030)
Marriedijt -0.006 (0.005) -4e-4 (0.024)
Continued on next page...
27... table 2 continued
Within-Jobs Between-Jobs








(24) : 264.72∗∗ χ2
(22): 57.86∗∗
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ :5 % ∗∗ :1 %
The regressions include time eﬀects
(1) SER= standard error of the regression (root mean square error)
(2) Wald test for joint signiﬁcance of time dummy coeﬃcients
(3) Wald test for joint signiﬁcance of all covariates
We run separate regressions for job stayers and changers. In the regression for
stayers, we ﬁnd evidence for concavity in the tenure and experience proﬁles, though
the higher order terms of the tenure proﬁle are smaller and less signiﬁcant than
those for the experience proﬁle. Other variables do not matter, except for living
in a metropolitan area, which positively inﬂuences wage growth. The results for job
movers do not ﬁt the simplest theory of a deterministic tenure proﬁle that is unrelated
to uit, since the coeﬃcients γ1 and γ2 are both insigniﬁcant. The only factor that
matters is union membership. This result is consistent with the right to manage
model of the union, see for example MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986), where unions
negotiate wages above the going market rate, but where ﬁr m sd e c i d eo ne m p l o y m e n t .
Moreover, the result is also consistent with some versions of the eﬃcient bargaining
model, where the union forces the ﬁrm to retain workers even when their wage is
above marginal productivity. It is inconsistent with Nash bargaining at an individual
level.
Table 3 presents the covariogram of the residuals of the within-job wage change
regression. Residuals are strongly negatively correlated to their ﬁrst lag, while auto-
correlations for longer lags are small and statistically insigniﬁcant beyond lag 3. Lag
1a n d2a r es t r o n g l ys i g n i ﬁcant, lag 3 is only marginally signiﬁcant at 5%. This out-
come is very similar to results obtained by MaCurdy(1982), Abowd and Card (1989)
28Table 3: Residual Autocovariances for Within-Job Wage Innovations
Lag Autocovariance Autocorrelation Sig. Level Obs.
0 .03213 1 0 11834
1 -.01056 -.35175 0 8992
2 -.00098 -.03342 .004 7385
3 .00072 .02484 .049 6293
4 .00025 .00866 .525 5381
5 -.00048 -.01781 .227 4590
6 -.00024 -.00913 .570 3875
7 -.00042 -.01657 .346 3238
8 .00015 .00591 .759 2691
9 -.00024 -.00917 .666 2209
10 .00066 .02358 .323 1755
11 -.00036 -.01402 .604 1370
12 .00007 .00323 .917 1034
13 .00061 .02944 .422 746
14 -.00061 -.02618 .553 516
15 -.00087 -.04970 .399 289
16 .00054 .04069 .681 104
and Topel and Ward (1992). Our covariogram is thus typical of an MA(2) process or
even an MA(1) once we note that the second order lag autocovariance is close to 0.5
For simplicity, we focus on the MA(1) case.
We decompose the stochastic time-variant component of the wage equation from
(18) in a martingale persistent component eit and a transitory component ηit:
uit = eit + ηit (21)
∆eit = εit
where ηit and εit are i.i.d. with Var(ηit)=σ2
η and Var(εit)=σ2
w,a sd e ﬁned before.
5We also considered the partial autocorrelation function (PACF) for the lagged residuals. The
PACF values, lag 1 to 16, are the following, with starred values statistiﬁcally signiﬁcant at 10%
or better: −0.35∗∗∗, −0.20∗∗∗, −0.07∗∗∗, −0.04∗∗∗, −0.02, −0.015, −0.04∗∗, −0.011, −0.03, 0.03,
0.008, 0.02, 0.06, −0.06, −0.08, 0.29∗. Hence, the PACF pattern further supports the pure MA











This is a reasonable description of the pattern of autocorrelations in the covariogram
in Table 2. A back-of-the-envelope calculation yields σ2
w =0 .022 and σ2
η =0 .005.
Our result for the variance of persistent income shocks is similar to that reported by
Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) for the PSID6. Hence, a random walk with transitory
shocks provides a fairly accurate description of the dynamics of log wages. The
standard deviation of yearly permanent innovations is substantial: 15% of the wage
level per year. The transitory shocks ηit might reﬂect measurement error.
Table 4 present results for the Koenker (1981) "Studentized LM" version of the
Breusch-Pagan (1979) test for homoskedasticity of uit f o rb o t hs t a y e r sa n dm o v e r s :
the squared residuals are regressed on a constant term and on all control variables.
Table 4: BP Heteroskedasticity Test for Wage Changes Within and
Between-Jobs
Within-Jobs Between-Jobs
Variable Coeﬃc i e n t( S t d . E r r . )C o e ﬃcient (Std. Err.)
Intercept -0.018 (0.015) 0.114 (0.090)
∆Tenureijt -0.003 (0.009)
∆Tenure2
ijt -2e-4 (3e-4) 6e-4 (0.001)
∆Tenure3
ijt -3e-6 (7e-6) -2e-5 (3e-5)
∆Experience2
it e-4 (4e-4) 0.001 (0.002)
∆Experience3
it 2e-6 ( 6e-6) -2e-5 (4e-5)
Educationijt 0.003∗∗ (9e-4) -7e-4 (0.006)
Metropolisijt 0.004 (0.003) 0.018 (0.020)
Union memberijt -0.017∗∗ (0.004) 0.033 (0.030)
Continued on next page...
6For their whole PSID sample of males heads of household, Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) obtain
0.031 as variance of the permanent income shocks. For highschool graduates without college degree
(the largest part of individuals in our PSID extract) they report an even closer result to ours, 0.027.
30... table 4 continued
Within-Jobs Between-Jobs
Variable Coeﬃc i e n t( S t d . E r r . )C o e ﬃcient (Std. Err.)











(24):N * R 2=87.57∗∗ χ2
(22:N * R 2=21.43
Signiﬁcance levels : † :1 0 % ∗ :5 % ∗∗ :1 %
The regressions include time eﬀects
The dependent variable is the square residual from Table 2.
We use Koenker’s (1981) modiﬁed version of the Breusch-Pagan test
The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected for stayers, but only because of
education and union membership. The evolution of wages in unionized jobs is largely
governed by predetermined wage scales, explaining the low variance of wage changes.
The higher variance for better educated workers squares with the conclusions from
studies analyzing risk in educational choice and is conﬁrmed also by other empirical
applications on the PSID. In the regression for job movers homoskedasticity is not
rejected. However, the variance in wages for movers is much higher than for stayers,
so there is clearly heteroskedasticity between movers and stayers. At ﬁrst sight this
result is hard to square with our theoretical framework, where wages follow a random
walk and where there is a perfect frictionless market for alternative job opportunities.
However, essential for our purpose is that there is no heteroskedasticity with respect
to either job tenure or experience. For example, a simple learning model would
imply a higher variance early on in the career, when people still have to learn their
capabilities and comparative advantages before ﬁnding their optimal profession, see
Jovanovic (1979) and Topel and Ward (1992). The results reported in Table 4 do not
conﬁrm this idea. Instead they provide support for the ideas put forward in Section
2, where wt is assumed to follow a random walk. When we assume that workers are
able to disentangle permanent and transitory shocks (which is certainly true if the
31transitory component ηit reﬂects measurement error or variation in hours worked),
then the transitory shock will not have an eﬀect on job changes because changing
jobs permanently is not a useful response to a shock that has only a transitory eﬀect:
as soon as you have changed jobs, the cause for changing has faded away. Hence, we
feel safe to ignore the eﬀect of transitory shocks of job relocation in the subsequent
analysis.
Our preparatory ground work provides support for the main ingredient of our
model, wages following a random walk, where neither the variance of the innovations
nor the wage loss of moving to another jobs depend on tenure and experience. There
are two aspects which do not ﬁt our theoretical framework well: (i) the larger wage
loss for union members upon job change, which seems to be prima facie evidence
against Nash bargaining for unionized ﬁrms, and (ii) the larger variance of wages
upon job change, which suggests that there are substantial search frictions on the
market for alternative job opportunities.
3.3 The Parameters of the Tenure Distribution
The parameters of the tenure distribution for the surplus Ω and the drift π can be
estimated by maximum likelihood, using the density function (8). Till sofar, we have
treated both parameters as constants which do not depend on worker characteristics.
However, one can expect that workers choose their optimal job type according to their
characteristics. Hence, Ω and π are likely to diﬀer according to both observed and
unobserved worker characteristics. Since we deal with longitudinal data we can take
into account random worker eﬀects. We do not consider random job eﬀects for both
theoretical and empirical reasons. From a theoretical point of view, our assumption
of a frictionless market for alternative job opportunities, where the only constraint on
instantaneous mobility is the speciﬁc investment in the present job and not the cost
of getting another job oﬀer, each worker type will choose that job type that ﬁts best
her comparative advantages, like in Sherwin Rosen’s famous hedonic world of kissing
32curves. Hence, job characteristics are implied by worker characteristics. The only
job characteristic that we allow for is union membership. From an empirical point of
view, we observe each job only once, so that we have no basis for identifying random
job eﬀects other than from functional form assumptions. Taking into account that Ω
has to be positive, the following speciﬁcation for Ω and π is adequate:










where uΩi and uπi are normally distributed random worker eﬀects with mean 0 and
standard deviations σΩ and σπ,a n dw h e r exij is a vector of observed worker charac-
teristics, i.e. education, experience at the start of the job spell, a dummy for union
membership, a dummy for living in a metropolitan city and a dummy for being mar-
ried7. We take all covariates (including the dummy variables) in deviations from their
means over jobs. Hence, the intercept can be interpreted as the mean value for Ω
and π respectively. We assume both random eﬀects to be uncorrelated. Then, the




















where j (i) is the jth j o bh e l db yw o r k e ri ( w el e a v eo u tt h ea r g u m e n ti of j (i) for the
sake of convenience), where dij is a dummy variable, taking the value dij =1if the job
spell is completed and the value dij =0otherwise, where Tij is the completed tenure
if dij =1and respectively the tenure at time L, the last moment of observation in
the panel, otherwise, and where N is the number of individuals and Ji is the number
7Since we do not observe prior mobility for most workers in our PSID sample we cannot include it
as covariate, as done for instance by Mincer and Jovanovic (1981) or Farber (1994). Although prior
mobility is often found to increase the probability of separation, whether this is due to unobserved
characteristics of the workers or it has a direct eﬀect on current tenure is unclear; including random
worker eﬀects we should be able to control for most unobserved worker characteristics.
33of jobs for individual i.
T h e r ea r et w or e a s o n sw h yw eh a v et om a k ea m e n d m e n t st ot h es i m p l el i k e l i h o o d
function in equation (23). First, we could restrict the estimation to job spells that
have started within the observation range of our PSID extract. However this means
that we do not consider jobs starting before the beginning of the observation period.
By construction, this would limit the maximum completed tenure in the data to
the maximum time span covered by the PSID sample, that is 17 years. Since long
tenures contain relevant information, we want to include spells starting before the
ﬁrst observation period of the PSID. We know all xij’s for these spells since there are
neither dummy indicator changes, nor education changes during the course of a job
and since we can compute experience at the beginning of a job by subtracting current
tenure from current experience. However, we observe these spells only conditional
on the fact that they have lasted till the start of our observation period. We should

















where tij is the tenure of individual i in job j at the start of the PSID. Note that for
spells started after the start of the PSID, tij =0 ,s oF (tij)=0 , meaning that we are
back in the simple case from (23).
Second, since the PSID collects data at a yearly interval, job spells completed
in less than a year are underreported. We know the elapsed tenure in months at
the ﬁrst moment a job spell is observed, by a retrospective question8, but we do
not know whether there has been another job spell between the job observed a year
ago and the job observed now. Since the hazard rate implied by our model is hump
shaped, with the hump likely to be within the ﬁrst year, cf. Farber (1994), this
8Initial tenures are either reported or inferred by making them consistent with the latest reported
tenures- see Altonji and Williams (1999 and previous working versions).
34phenomenon is expected to have a large impact on the estimation results. We are
likely to overestimate Ω and π, since we miss part of the short tenures in our data.
Hence, we have to correct for this form of left censoring. One solution to this problem
is to use a similar conditioning as in equation (24), where tij is the initial tenure in
months as measured at the ﬁrst observation after the start of the spell. However, this
approach does not use the distribution of these tij’s itself9 We can use this distribution
if we are prepared to make the additional assumption that the starting date of job
spells is distributed uniformly over the ﬁrst year. Then, the density q(·) of initial
dates of spells that started throughout the year and are still incomplete at the end of
the year satisﬁes:
q(t)=
1 − F (t)
R 1
0 [1 − F (x)]dx
The total contribution to the likelihood of a spell with initial tenure t and completed
tenure T is therefore:
f (T)




0 [1 − F (x)]dx


















The log likelihood that accounts both for jobs starting before the ﬁr s tw a v eo ft h e
PSID and for the left censoring for spells shorter than a year started after the ﬁrst
9Maximum likelihood estimation using this approach yields a huge hump in the hazard rate, which
implies a much higher share of spells shorter than a year that can be justiﬁed from the distribution
of tij for jobs started after the ﬁrst wave.





















if spell starts after start PSID:
R 1
0 [1 − F(x)]dx
if spell starts before start PSID: 1 − F(tij)
We report results for (25), where we use only the jobs that start within the observation
period of the PSID, and for (26), where we use the sample including job spells starting
before the ﬁrst wave of the PSID10. The estimation results are presented in Table 5.
Theoretically, the results for both likelihood functions should be identical. Two
observations are in place. First, though the two sets of estimation results are statis-
tically diﬀerent, the theoretical hazards for both models look very similar (cf. Figure
1a b o v e ) ,t h eo n l yd i ﬀerence being the height of the peak (lower for the case where
we use all job spells). The estimated intercepts of Ω and respectively π are more
or less identical (remember that all other xij are taken in deviation from the mean,
so that the intercept is something like the mean value for Ω and π), but the coeﬃ-
cients for other variables diﬀer substantially, in particular those that are less precisely
measured in the small sample. Second, a number of results in Table 5 are consistent
across both estimations. Spells started at higher age and spells at unionized ﬁrms
have a larger drift πij. When we include the spells started before the ﬁrst wave of
the PSID, these variables also have a positive eﬀect on the surplus Ωij.T h ep o s i t i v e
eﬀect of experience would be consistent with the idea that workers start their career
with some initial job hopping, before settling down in a job that ﬁts one’s compara-
10In order to estimate the log-likelihood functions above, we used simulated maximum likelihood,
cf. Stern (1997). Sampling from a joint normal distribution with mean 0 and variances σ2
π and σ2
Ω
and using a sampling size of 500 sampling points (the results are robust to altering the sampling
dimension to any size between 100 and 500 sampling points) we achieved strong convergence in a
reasonable number of iterations. We used the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) method
for convergence of derivatives, allowing for a tolerance of 1E-4 times the absolute value of the log
likelihood.
36tive advantages best. For the positive eﬀect of union membership, economic theory
provides two explanations, one in which union membership causes a high Ωij and
one in which the causality runs the other way around. The ﬁr s ta r g u m e n tr e l i e so n
a hold up problem. Unions extract part of the ﬁrm’s compensation for the speciﬁc
investment at job start. Firms respond by postponing job openings till the surplus
Ωij is so large that even their smaller share in it provides suﬃcient compensation
for their investment. This type of argument is supported by empirical ﬁndings in
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) where if ﬁrms are insulated from takeovers, wages
rise, while the rates of destruction of old plants and creation of new plants fall. The
second argument relies on the idea that the larger Ωij, the larger the workers’ incen-
tives to get a proper share in it, and hence the greater the payoﬀ of setting up a union.
Our estimation results do not allow distinguishing between these two scenarios. The
second result that is consistent between both set of estimation results is that the
intercept for πij is positive and large. In both cases, there are hardly observations for
which πij is negative. This implies that some job spells will last until the retirement
of the worker. The fraction of jobs that never end for mean values of the parameters
is about 10%, as calculated in Section 2. This observation will play an important role
in the rest of the analysis.
Table 5: MLE Tenure Distribution Parameters
Small Sample(1) Large Sample(2)
Variable Drift π Dist Ω Drift π Dist Ω
Intercept 0.228∗∗ -1.208 ∗∗ 0.158∗∗ -1.132∗∗
(st. errors) (0.021) (0.155) (0.0015) (0.014)
Education 0.017 0.040 -0.0005 -0.032∗∗
(st. errors) (0.012) (0.039) (0.0008) (0.007)
Initial experience 0.008∗∗ -0.009 0.011∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(st. errors) (0.002) (0.009) (0.0002) (0.001)
Union member 0.233∗∗ 0.271 0.138∗∗ 0.795∗∗
(st. errors) (0.056) (0.175) (0.003) (0.025)
Metropolis 0.015 0.070 0.009∗∗ -0.133∗∗
(st. errors) (0.043) (0.140) (0.002) (0.023)
Married 0.091† 0.121 -0.033∗∗ -0.012
(st. errors) (0.049) (0.162) (0.003) (0.030)
Continued on next page...
37... table 5 continued
Small Sample Large Sample
Variable Drift Dist Drift Dist
Random worker eﬀects σ 0.277∗∗ 0.0001 1.34e-8 1.75e-7
(st. errors) (0.050) (5.51) (0.001) (0.010)
Number Observations (job spells) 1911 5484
(1)Small sample= sample of job spells starting within the range of the PSID sample
(2)Large sample= sample of all job spells
All covariates are taken in deviations from their means over jobs
Signiﬁcance levels: † :1 0 % ∗ :5 % ∗∗ :1 %
One remarkable conclusion is that there are no unobserved worker eﬀects when we
use the sample including the spells started before the ﬁr s tw a v eo ft h eP S I D ,w h i l e
there is unobserved heterogeneity in the drift for the sample without these spells.
Since the long spells started before the ﬁrst wave contain crucial information, we
focus on the estimation results obtained from the full sample of job spells in what
follows.
For future reference and as a test of the goodness of ﬁt of the model, we compute
the density of incomplete job spells after a ﬁxed working experience, in this case
L =3 2years.11 Figure 6 depicts both the predicted and the empirical density of
incomplete job spells. There is a reasonable correspondence between both densities.
The peak in the ﬁrst year is overestimated, but otherwise the shapes of the two
densities are identical. Note the small peak in the density for short incomplete spells,
which is due to the hump shape pattern in the hazard: if your job ends for instance
in the last ﬁve years before the end of the observation period, there is a substantial
11This density is calculated by a recursive scheme. We divide the 32 years time period in 32×256
subperiods. We calculate the distribution of completed tenures for jobs starting at the beginning of
the career, in the ﬁrst subperiod. For some of these jobs, T>32, which is the density of incomplete
tenures of 32 years. Then we calculate the distribution of completed tenures for jobs starting in the
second subperiod, which is the number of jobs started in the ﬁrst subperiod that separate in the
second. We add this number to the corresponding completed tenures of the jobs started in the ﬁrst
subperiod. Then we calculate the completed tenure for jobs started in the third subperiod, etc. In
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Figure 6: Density of Incomplete Job Spells with Exit Option
probability that you experience further separations afterwards due to the peak in the
hazard rate, leading to a peak of short incomplete tenures. Close alignment of the
predicted and the empirical densities suggests that our model works well.
3.4 Wage Dynamics
Table 6 presents estimation results on wage changes, separately for completed job
spells, incomplete job spells and at job transitions, with heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors12..
12We tested for the absence of individual speciﬁce ﬀects. We left out marital status as a regressor
since it was insigniﬁcant in all regressions.
39Table 6: Wage Changes in Completed Spells, Incomplete Spells
and at Job Transitions
1: Completed 2: Incomplete 3: Job Switch
A: Unrestricted Regression Estimates
Intercept 0.060∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.216∗
(st. errors) (0.015) (0.010) (0.102)
∆E(Ωijt) 0.008 0.039∗∗ 0.137∗
(st. errors) (0.006) (0.013) (0.062)
Ωi,j+1,0 0.308∗
(st. errors) (0.145)
Expijt -0.004∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.007
(st. errors) (0.002) (9e-4) (0.007)
Exp2
ijt 8e-5 9e-5∗∗ 6e-5
(st. errors) (5e-5) (2e-5) (e-4)
Educijt 0.002 e-4 0.031∗∗
(st. errors) (0.002) (0.001) (0.009)
Unionijt 0.006 -0.004 -0.163∗∗
(st. errors) (0.010) (0.003) (0.062)
Metropolisijt 0.007 0.011∗∗ -0.017
(st. errors) (0.008) (0.003) (0.031)
Observations 2022 9653 618
SER 0.177 0.180 0.362





B: Restricted Regression Estimates
Intercept 0.049∗∗ 0.147†
(st. errors) (0.017) (0.079)
+∆E(Ωijt)(a) 0.051∗ 0.075∗∗(b)






(st. errors) (0.002) (0.007)
Exp2
ijt 6e-5 7e-5
(st. errors) (5e-5) (e-4)
Educijt 0.002 0.030∗∗
(st. errors) (0.002) (0.009)
Unionijt 0.007 -0.161∗∗
(st. errors) (0.010) (0.061)
Metropolisijt 0.007 -0.016






Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ :5 % ∗∗ :1 %
(a) The +/- split of ∆E(Ωijt)i su s e df o rc o m p l e t e ds p e l l s
Continued on next page...
40... table 6 continued
(b) For the job to job transitions we use the "full fall" in E(Ωijt)
Panel (A) of the table above presents unrestricted regression results for job stayers,
cf. equation (14), for completed spells in column 1 and for incomplete spells in column
2, and for job movers, cf. equation (15), in column 3. The theoretically relevant
regressors, ∆E(Ωijt|T,L) and Ωi,j+1, have the right sign. The other variables tend
to have limited eﬀect. However, the coeﬃcient on ∆E(Ωijt|T,L) should be the same
in all three regressions, namely (1 − γ)σ. Clearly, this prediction is not conﬁrmed
by the data. Panel (B) therefore considers a slightly amended version of the model.
Consider Figures 2 to 5 on the trajectories of E(Ωijt|T) for completed spells. These
trajectories are falling in the period just before separation. Suppose that there is
downward rigidity that prevents wages from actually falling. This is consistent, for
example, with the study by Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), who show that within a job
spell wages go up when unemployment falls, but do not go down when unemployment
rises. We could test this idea in a crude way by separating the initial part of the job
spell for which the surplus is increasing, ∆E(Ωijt|T) > 0,a n dt h eﬁnal part for which
the surplus is decreasing, ∆E(Ωijt|T) > 0, and enter both as separate regressors. The
estimation results for this model are presented in column 1. The results strongly
conﬁrm our hypothesis: the upward part comes in with a coeﬃcient which is very
similar in size with the coeﬃcient for ∆E(Ωijt|T>L ), from Panel (A), column 2.
Furthermore, if this downward rigidity model really applies, one would expect that
"missing wage declines" in the years before separation are actually compensated at
the moment of separation by an additional fall. Hence, we include in the regression for
job changers not the change in the surplus during the year of separation, ∆E(Ωij,T−1),
but the full decline, starting from the maximum of E(Ωijt|T) during the job spell, till
its minimum value at the moment of separation, E(ΩijT)=0 . The results for this
model are presented in column 3 of Panel B. The relevant coeﬃcient comes down from
410.137 to 0.075, a number that is close to the coeﬃcients found for the wage changes
in completed and incomplete spells. Both results provide support for our amended
model.
Table 7 combines the regressions for completed spells, incomplete spells and job
changers for this amended model, that is, column 2 of Panel A and columns 1 and 3
of Panel B from Table 6 above.



























Signiﬁcance levels : † :1 0 % ∗ :5 % ∗∗ :1 %
(a) Union and education are interacted with job change
We make one further amendment to the model, by interacting union membership
and education level with job change, so that both variables aﬀect only the wage change
for job movers. We weight the three samples by their respective standard errors of the
regression (SER) obtained in each of the three separate restricted regression models.
The F(14,12270) statistic of the restriction that the coeﬃcients of these 3 regressions
42are equal is 0.667, so that restrictions are accepted. Hence, the amended model
provides a good description of the data. The only exception are union members,
who face a 17% additional wage loss upon separation. Furthermore, the positive
eﬀect of education on the wage change of movers is not predicted by the model
(note that education enters the regression via its eﬀect on Ωij, see Table 5). The
estimation results yield (1 − γ)σ =0 .041 and σ =0 .332,i m p l y i n gγ =0 .877.T h i s
is a remarkable result. Apparently, separation is driven by selectivity in the shocks
to the worker’s reservation wage rt, not to the current job’s productivity pt,w h i c h
seems somewhat counter-intuitive. Similarly, we can calculate the return to tenure,
σπ =0 .332 ∗ 0.15 = 5% (taking the estimated mean value of π =0 .15). However,
the high value of γ implies that most of the return to tenure, more than 85%,t a k e s
the form of the log reservation wage rt falling, instead of the inside wage wt rising,
cf. equation (13). The tenure proﬁle due to the rise in log productivity in the current
job pt is really small, (1−γ)σπ =0 .041∗0.15 = 0.6%. Both estimates, that of γ and
of the tenure proﬁle, are fully driven by the estimate of σ,w h i c ha ti t st u r ni sd r i v e n
by the eﬀect of Ωijt on the wage change for job movers, see equation (15). Although
this is a rather thin line of identiﬁcation and thus the part of the tenure proﬁle due
to selectivity is only weakly identiﬁed, this is the ﬁrst research to actually account
for selectivity in the observed outside wages.
The result above suggests that the return to tenure is due more to the deaccumula-
tion of general human capital, rather than to the accumulation of job-speciﬁch u m a n
capital13. The part of the return to tenure due to the expected fall in the reserva-
tion wage is in fact a mirror image of Topel’s (1991, page 153) argument for why his
estimator is a lower bound of the true return to tenure. Topel argues that observed
starting wages are a selective sample from the distribution of wage oﬀers, since only
13This result is not inconsistent with studies showing that post-displacement wages are positively
related to pre-displacement tenure, e.g. Kletzer (1989). Firstly, Kletzer’s evidence is solely based on
involuntary job separations, while our model is based on both voluntary and involuntary separations.
Secondly, displaced workers with high pre-displacement tenure are expected to stay unemployed
longer. Our model does not account for unemployment spells.
43relatively favorable oﬀers are accepted. Hence, a regression of starting wages in new
jobs on experience yields an upper bound of the true return to experience. Since this
estimate is used to decompose the total yearly wage increase within a job in a return
to tenure and a return to experience, an upper bound for the return to experience
implies a lower bound for the return to tenure. The latter is a lower bound since it
ignores the selectivity in accepted wage oﬀers. Topel’s (1991) method does not allow
for the estimation of the magnitude of this eﬀect. Our model imposes more structure,
which enables inference on this issue. Our empirical analysis suggests this selectivity
eﬀect to be sizeable.
Equation (17) runs the test of comparing the concavity in the tenure proﬁle to
the variance in wage changes. Table 8 presents estimation results for equation (16).
Table 8: Initial Wage Changes Regressions at Job Transition
1: Mean(a) 2: Variance(a),(b)
Intercept Intercept 0.092∗∗
(st. errors) (st. errors) (0.024)
Teni,j−1,T
(c) 0.057∗∗ Teni,j−1,T-1 0.019∗∗











(1):7 . 4 4 ∗∗
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ :5 % ∗∗ :1 %
(a) We use completed jobs that last more than 1 year (Teni,j−1,T >1)
(b) The dependent variable is the squared residual from the left column estimation
(c) Teni,j−1,T=Expij0-Expi,j−1,0
We restrict the sample to jobs lasting more than 1 year, since wage changes for
jobs that last only one year are noisy anyway14. Column 1 reports the coeﬃcients of
14Using the whole sample, the coeﬃcient of T in the variance of wages regression is 0.010.
44the regression. Column 2 takes the squared residuals from the ﬁrst regression, and
regresses them on elapsed tenure, T. The intercept captures the excess variance for
job movers, see Table 4, and the transitory shocks in wages, ηijt, see equation (21).
The coeﬃcient for T is a consistent estimator of 1
TVar(w∗
0 − w0). An estimator for
σ2
w is derived from the regression for within-job wage changes in Table 4, see Section
3.2. Hence:
(1 − γ)σ =
√
0.022 − 0.019 = 0.054
which is very similar to the estimated value in Table 7, 0.041.. Thus the amended
model provides a good description of the data. The concavity of the tenure proﬁle
is fully captured by the term ∆E(Ωijt|T,L) and the size of its regression coeﬃcient
is consistent with the variance of yearly wage innovations and the variance of initial
wages over job spells.
A ﬁnal question we ask is to what extent the option to switch jobs limits the growth
of the variance in log wages over time. Without the option to switch jobs, the variance
of log wages would increase linearly over time, due to the fact that zt and bt follow
a random walk. However, the option to switch jobs allows the worker to eliminate
bad trajectories of bt, thereby compressing its variance. This can be seen from the
distribution of incomplete tenures, see Figure 6, showing that a substantial fraction
of the jobs has an incomplete tenure of less than 32 years. There are two mechanisms
that lead to compression. First, many jobs have an incomplete tenure of less than
32 years and hence a smaller variance, since the variance increases proportional to
incomplete tenure. Second, those jobs that are still going on after some period are
a selective sample of all the trajectories that have started initially, namely those
which never crossed the separation threshold. This selection process compresses the
variance. We use the density of incomplete tenures in Figure 6, and the density of
Ωt = bt/σ conditional on the incomplete tenure T, g(Ωt,t,Ω0)/[1 − F (t,Ω0)],s e e
equations (6) and (7). In Figure 7, we plot the evolution of the variance of bt without
the option to switch jobs, the line σ2T, and the evolution of the variance with that
45option. The plots reveal that the option to switch jobs compresses the variance of bt
considerably: by about 65% after 32 years of experience 15. Note however that the
variance of zt remains unaﬀected by this process, while this accounts for the main
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Figure 7: Compression Eﬀect of the Exit Option on the Wage Variance
4 Concluding Remarks
Our simple model for the stochastic evolution of productivity explains the data on the
job tenure distribution and wages for the USA surprisingly well. This model features
frictionless labor market at the moment of job start (which enables workers to pick the
15We use σ =0 .041, our estimated coeﬃcient from Table 7. Hence, after 32 years of experience,
without the exit option the variance of bt would be 32 ∗ 0.412 =0 .054. With the option to exit the
wage variance is compressed after the same period to about 0.019.
46best job alternative straightaway), speciﬁc investment and hence subsequent lock-in
on the current job, and eﬃcient bargaining over the match surplus. We have proven
the remarkable result that in this model the evolution of log wages in completed job
spells does not provide any information whatsoever on wage-tenure proﬁles, since this
evolution is independent of the drift in log wages. Hence, the tenure proﬁle can only
be estimated either from the distribution of tenure or from log wages in incomplete
j o bs p e l l s .W eh a v ev e r i ﬁed that the wage dynamics within jobs closely resembles a
random walk; that the predicted job hazard rate is humped shaped with the peak
very early in time, closely tracing the empirical evidence on job exits; and that the
variance of the within-job wages does not diminish with tenure or experience, a fact
that is less easily squared with the learning model. We have further shown that the
concavity in the observed tenure proﬁle is easily explained by the selection of the
surviving employment matches, even when the underlying tenure proﬁle is linear. In
general, the selection eﬀect tends to be much more important than the deterministic
trend. This is in fact the ﬁrst research that looks at selectivity in the observed
outside productivities. Remarkably, job separation is driven more by the selectivity
in the outside productivity rt than by shocks to the inside productivity in the job
pt.M o r et h a n5/6 of our estimated tenure proﬁle is accounted for by this selectivity
in the outside option. However, identiﬁcation of the part of the variance due to
variation in rt is fragile, since we observe rt only at the moment of job switching.
We ﬁnd excess variance of wages at job transition, indicating that our assumption
of frictionless market for alternatives is incorrect. Apparently, there is a great deal
more randomness in the wage in a new job than is to be expected from a model with
frictionless market.
Our model implies that, on average, wages should be falling relative to the wages
in other jobs in the second half of a completed spell. The data do not fully support
this prediction. Apparently, there is some downward rigidity in wages. This is in
particular true for unionized jobs, suggesting that there is ineﬃcient separation in
47the unionized sector. Eﬃcient bargaining over the match surplus is clearly rejected
for unionized jobs. A slightly adjusted model, allowing for downward rigidity in
wages, can explain the data very well:
Ψt =m a x ( Ωt,Ψt−1)
wt = rt + σΨt
where job separation is still governed by the rule that a job ends at the ﬁrst moment
in time that Ωt reaches 0. Ψt is the maximum of its value in the previous period and
the current value of Ωt. Then, we would observe more wage rigidity in job spells that
are expected to end shortly (since there Ωt is declining), which explains that ∆Ωt
does not aﬀect ∆wt for ∆Ωt < 0. Hence, the standard error of ∆wt should be smaller
in the period just before separation. This model needs to be analyzed more formally,
but the analysis presented here suggests that it provides an adequate description of
the data.
A Computational Appendix
A.1 Completed job spells
The ﬁrst factor in the numerator of (10) is given by the equation of the density













The second part of the numerator in (10) was given in (6).






























Interestingly, this probability density does not depend at all on the drift π.T h e
drift aﬀects therefore the distribution of completed job tenures (see expression 7
above), but not the distribution of Ωt conditional on the completed tenure.
The expectation in (11) can now be calculated:































If we denote f (t) ≡ T−t
T in (29) above we obtain exactly (11).



















































49A.2 Incomplete job spells
The ﬁrst factor in the numerator of (12) is given by substituting t with L and Ω with
ω in (7):
1 − F(L − t,ω) (32)
= Φ
µ











g(ω,t,Ω) was given in (6).
The complicated part in (12) resides in the integral from the denominator of (12).
The task would involve computing integrals of the form:
Z ∞
0
φ(ax + b)Φ(cx + d)dx (33)
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